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Abstract
The grasp compatibility effect has been put forward as evidence for the automatic involvement of the motor system during mental
object representation. In three experiments, participants responded to object pictures or names by grasping cylinders using a precision
or power grasp. In a two-choice task in which both grasps were used, we obtained grasp compatibility effects, but in a go/no-go task, in
which only one grasp was used, there was no effect. These results indicate that the effect depends on the availability of response choice,
in the present case, different size grasps. This suggests that grasp compatibility effects are better explained by coding of the stimulus and
response on the same dimension, size, rather than automatic activation of a motor action towards the object.
Keywords Grasp compatibility . Motor affordances . Grounded cognition . Conceptual memory . Stimulus–response
compatibility
When we think about a task, such as cutting a sheet of paper, we
can bring to mind sensory-motor details of the experience, such
as how to grasp and move the scissors, the feel of the slight
resistance of the paper as the scissors cut through it, and the sound
of the scissors closing. According to several views, whichwewill
summarize as grounded cognition, mental representations share
processing mechanisms and neural circuitry with sensory-motor
processes (Barsalou, 1999; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Glenberg,
1997; Pulvermüller, 1999; Thill, Caligiore, Borghi, Ziemke, &
Baldassarre, 2013). In this view, cognitive processes such as the
activation of mental concepts rely on simulations—the reactiva-
tion of sensory-motor neural states. Evidence from behavioral
and neuroscience studies indeed suggests that motor actions are
a fundamental part of object conceptual knowledge and are acti-
vated automatically when manipulable objects are mentally rep-
resented (Chao, Haxby, & Martin, 1999; Chao & Martin, 2000;
Creem&Profitt, 2001;Derbyshire, Ellis,&Tucker, 2006; Heard,
Masson, & Bub, 2015; Masson, Bub, & Breuer, 2011;
Rueschemeyer, van Rooij, Lindemann, Willems, & Bekkering,
2010; but see Pelgrims, Olivier, & Andres, 2011).
These findings suggest that information about the actions re-
quired to use an object is stored in memory and that this
information is activated even when it is irrelevant for the
current task. Derbyshire et al. (2006) stated that Brepresenting
the object in what ever form will give rise to affordance effects^
(p. 95), by which they mean that affordances will be activated
even if an object is retrieved from memory rather than actually
present. An important finding that suggests that motor actions are
activated as part of the mental representations of objects is the
spatial alignment effect (Tucker & Ellis, 1998).When objects are
depicted with a graspable part (e.g., a cup with a handle), manual
responses are faster when handle and response side are aligned
than when they are not aligned. For example, Tucker and Ellis
(1998) found that spatial alignment effects between the left–right
orientation of an object handle and the response location occur
only when participants respond with two hands and not when
they respondwith different fingers of the same hand. This finding
suggested that the alignment effect is due to activation of a grasp-
ing response towards the depicted object. Other studies have
shown, however, that left–right alignment effects depend on sev-
eral factors, such aswhether attention is drawn towards the grasp-
able part of the object by task instructions (Thomas, Stötefalk,
Pecher, & Zeelenberg, 2019; Yu, Abrams, & Zacks, 2014; but
see Riggio et al., 2008), whether the object handle protrudes to
one side of the object (Bub & Masson, 2010; Cho & Proctor,
2011), and by the similarity of the response action to the action
afforded by the stimulus (actual reach and grasp vs. key press;
Bub & Masson, 2010; but see Cho & Proctor, 2013; Roest,
Pecher, Naeije, & Zeelenberg, 2016). Thus, the spatial alignment
effect does not provide strong evidence for the automatic activa-
tion of motor actions.
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Some findings even suggest that the alignment effect is not
due to overlap between stimulus and response at the motor
action level, but at a more abstract level. Support for this view
is the presence of alignment effects when participants
responded with two fingers of the same hand (Cho &
Proctor, 2010; Thomas et al., 2019) or when they responded
with crossed hands or with their feet (Phillips & Ward, 2002;
Thomas et al., 2019). Therefore, the alternative view, that
alignment effects are due to correspondence between the stim-
ulus and response in terms of abstract spatial codes, also
seems plausible. Alignment effects may thus be a Simon-
like effect. In the task context, stimulus and response may be
coded in terms of task-relevant features or dimensions such as
left–right orientation. Such spatial schemas are independent of
modality (Chatterjee, 2010; Gentner, 2003; Gibbs, 2006) and
represent space independent of specific sensory-motor fea-
tures (Pecher, Boot, & van Dantzig, 2011; Pecher &
Zeelenberg, 2018). Responses will be facilitated if the stimu-
lus and response correspond on that dimension compared with
when they do not (Iani, Baroni, Pellicano, & Nicoletti, 2011;
Masson, 2015; Proctor & Miles, 2014). Given that several
findings are hard to explain by automatic activation of motor
actions towards depicted objects, one may wonder if the align-
ment effect can be convincingly used as evidence that motor
actions are part of object representations.
One may argue that handle location (left or right side of the
object) may not strongly activate action knowledge for con-
cepts, because an object’s orientation is variant. An object’s
volumetric grasp, on the other hand, is less variant (Borghi &
Riggio, 2015). Because grasp size is more stable, it should be
part of object knowledge. Indeed, Yu et al. (2014) argued that
grip size may be activated automatically, whereas grip loca-
tion may not be activated automatically, which may explain
why left–right alignment effects are strongly context depen-
dent. Consistent with the idea that grip size is activated for
object concepts, several studies have shown that grasping re-
sponses are faster if they are compatible with a presented
object than if they are incompatible. Tucker and Ellis (2004)
presented object pictures and names in a natural/artefact deci-
sion task. Half of the objects afforded a precision grasp (e.g.,
screw) and the other half a power grasp (e.g., hammer).
Participants responded by squeezing a response device be-
tween thumb and index finger (a precision grasp) for one
category and squeezing the device with the entire hand (a
power grasp) for the other category. Response times were
faster if the object and response grasp were compatible than
if they were incompatible. The grasp compatibility effect is
associated with differences in activity in the left hemisphere
within the parietal, premotor, and frontal cortex (Grezes,
Tucker, Armony, Ellis, & Passingham, 2003), suggesting that
the effect is due to object-related activity in neural motor
areas. Grasp compatibility effects for pictures and words have
been observed also in a color decision task for both volumetric
and functional grasps (Bub, Masson, & Cree, 2008). That the
effect is obtained for words (see also Canits, Pecher, &
Zeelenberg, 2018; Gentilucci & Gangitano, 1998; Glover &
Dixon, 2002; Glover, Rosenbaum, Graham, & Dixon, 2004)
and for functionally related grasps supports the view that the
grasp compatibility effect is due to activated conceptual action
knowledge rather than visual features of the stimulus.
Just as for the spatial alignment effect, however, an alter-
native explanation based on abstract codes has been proposed
for the grasp compatibility effect. Responses may be faster
when there is correspondence in size between object and re-
sponse (Masson, 2015; Proctor & Miles, 2014), which would
entail that the compatibility effect is due to abstract size codes
rather than direct activation of motor actions. Bub et al. (2008)
tested whether the grasp compatibility effect might have been
due to similarities in size or shape between the stimulus object
and the response device rather than due to activation of the
grasp response. Their response device consisted of four alu-
minum forms, each allowing a different grasp, that were ar-
ranged on a curved base in front of the participant. Participants
responded to the color of object pictures by grasping or touch-
ing the form that was associated to the color. Bub et al. found
that the compatibility effect was reduced to nonsignificance
when participants pointed and touched the response device
with the tip of their finger rather than grasped it (see also
Girardi, Lindemann, & Bekkering, 2010). This finding seems
problematic for the idea that correspondences in size explain
the grasp compatibility effect, because it suggests that a grasp-
ing action is necessary for the compatibility effect. On the
other hand, when participants responded by touching the re-
sponse device they may have coded responses on a location
rather than size dimension, which would have eliminated the
correspondence effect.
In the present study, we aimed to test these two competing
explanations of the grasp compatibility effect. If the effect is due
to automatic activation of grounded action representations, the
mere representation of an object should automatically activate the
associated grasping action and this should influence reach and
grasp responses. If, on the other hand, the grasp compatibility
effect is due to correspondence of abstract modality-independent
features, such as size, as has been suggested by Masson (2015)
and Proctor andMiles (2014; see also Cho & Proctor, 2010), the
compatibility effect is expected to occur only if size is relevant
for both stimulus and response. To manipulate the relevance of
grip size for the response, we used a go/no-go procedure inwhich
participants responded with only one type of grip (either power
or precision grip). In a go/no-go task, participants do not need to
represent different responses, which makes the grasp size dimen-
sion irrelevant and eliminates one half of the stimulus–response
correspondence (Ansorge &Wühr, 2004; Roest et al., 2016). An
abstract coding account would therefore predict no grasp com-
patibility effect in a go/no-go task. Note, however, that according
to the affordance account, the perception of an object results in
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the activation or potentiation of the actions afforded by the object
(Tucker & Ellis, 1998). When there is a match between the
actions afforded by the object and the action performed by the
participant, responding is facilitated relative to situations inwhich
there is no such match and an incongruent, competing action is
activated. It has been argued that because of the automatic link
between perception and action, the actions afforded by an object
are activated even in the absence of action preparation or action
intention. Thus, motor affordance effects should be obtained
even when the task does not require the preparation of a motor
response on every trial (Dixon, Goslin, & Ellis, 2012). Even on a
more context-dependent view of the role of motor actions for
object representations, however, motor actions should be activat-
ed if the task requires a reach and grasp response such as in the
present study.
We compared the go/no-go task to a two-choice version of the
task, where participants responded by grasping one of two re-
sponse devices—one affording a precision grip and one
affording a power grip. Note that Tucker and Ellis (2001) also
used a go/no-go task, but in their version of the task a tone
indicated whether the go response was precision or power grasp,
thus activating two types of responses. The availability of a re-
sponse alternative may activate the dimension on which they
vary, creating correspondence effects (Hommel, 1996). Lien,
Pedersen, and Proctor (2016) have shown that even the presence
of a task-irrelevant Japanese waving cat could induce a spatial
reference frame in a go/no-go auditory Simon task. Ansorge and
Wühr (2004) showed that when the go/no-go task followed a
two-choice task, the Simon effect still occurred, suggesting that
even the memory of alternative responses induced correspon-
dence effects. Therefore, we made sure that only one grip device
was visible to participants during the go/no-go version of the task
and that the go/no-go version always preceded the two-choice
version. In addition, we made sure that participants had not par-
ticipated in a similar experiment, which could induce the mem-
ory of a task with alternate responses.
As an exploratory analysis we also looked at the timing of
the compatibility effect. The size of the effect may depend on
the SOA between presentation of the object and response cue,
or may differ across the RT distribution. Researchers have used
these patterns to compare conditions in which the role of auto-
matically activated actions was likely to conditions where it was
unlikely (Cho & Proctor, 2010; Phillips & Ward, 2002).
Interpretation of the timing of compatibility effect, however,
is complicated. Some have argued that activation of afforded
actions tends to occur quickly and dissipate fast, whereas effects
due to conceptual processing tend to occur late or last longer
(Bub, Masson, & Kumar, in press; Ferri, Riggio, Gallese, &
Costantini, 2011; Hommel, 1996). Bub et al. (in press), how-
ever, observed a more or less constant effect across the RT
distribution, which they interpreted as showing that the object
directly activated actions because the effect occurred in the
faster RTs even though it did not decrease with RT. In contrast,
Derbyshire et al. (2006) have argued the opposite—namely,
that effects due to activation of affordances increase with RT.
Because of this mixed state of affairs, we did not have specific
expectations about the timing of the grasp compatibility effect.
Nevertheless, it might still be interesting to look at the distribu-
tion of compatibility effects and compare those of the two-
choice task and the go/no-go task.
In Experiment 1, participants made color decisions to pho-
tographs of natural objects and artefacts. Half of the objects in
each category afforded a precision grasp, and the other half
afforded a power grasp. Responses were made by a reach and
grasp towards one of two cylinders (Bub & Masson, 2010)
that afforded a precision or a power grasp. In the go/no-go
version, participants responded to one color by grasping one
cylinder and withheld their response to the other color. In the
two-choice version, participants responded to both colors by
grasping one cylinder for one of the colors (red) and the other
cylinder for the other color (blue). If the grasp compatibility
effect is driven by automatic activation of motor actions to-
wards objects, we expect that in both versions responses
would be faster if the cylinder afforded the same grasp as
the object. If, on the other hand, the effect is driven by corre-
spondences in abstract codes for object size and grasp size, we
expect the effect to occur only in the two-choice version of the
task. Although, in principle, participants could start preparing
their grasp before they see the color in the go/no-go task but
not in the two-choice task, studies have shown that the degree
of response preparation does not critically influence compati-
bility effects (Hommel, 1996).
Experiment 1
Method
Participants Forty students at the Erasmus University
Rotterdam participated for course credit.
Materials A set of 76 black-and-white photographs were used
consisting of 19 large natural objects, 19 small natural objects, 19
large artefacts, and 19 small artefacts. A red and a blue version of
each photograph were created, as illustrated in Fig. 1. The com-
plete set of items is listed in the Appendix Table 2. An additional
set of 10 photographs of five natural objects and five artefacts
was used for practice. Objects were shown such that they
afforded a grasp with the dominant hand. Thus, for left-handed
participants, the photographs were mirror images of the photo-
graphs presented to right-handed participants.
A custom-made device, the Grabbit, was used to collect
grasping responses (Roest et al., 2016). This device, inspired
by Bub et al.’s (2008) Graspasaurus, and previously used by
Roest et al. (2016) and Canits et al. (2018), consisted of a
medium density fiberboard baseboard with one or two metal
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cylinders attached to it. The thin cylinder was 1 cm wide and
afforded a precision grip (using thumb and index finger), and
the thick cylinder was 6 cm wide and afforded a power grip
(using the full hand). Both were 14 cm tall. During the go/no-
go task, only one of the two cylinders was attached to the
middle of the base, and the other cylinder was kept out of sight
of the participant to prevent coding of a size reference frame.
In the two-choice task, the two cylinders were placed at a
distance of 20 cm from each other (from cylinder midpoint
to cylinder midpoint). The cylinders were connected via an
electrical wire to a Makey Makey ® (JoyLabz LLC), which
translated a touch of the cylinders into key-press input to the
computer. In order to close a low voltage electric circuit, the
participant was also attached to the Makey Makey via a
BioSemi flat electrode that was attached to their nonresponse
hand. TheGrabbit was placed between the computer keyboard
and the computer monitor such that the B key on the keyboard,
which was used as the starting point of the trial, was equally
distant from each cylinder’s midpoint. Examples of the two
setups are shown in Fig. 2.
Procedure Participants were tested individually while they
were seated at a desk with a computer and the Grabbit.
Participants were instructed to make red/blue decisions to a
series of photographs shown on the computer screen. As ex-
plained above, the experiment started with the go/no-go ver-
sion of the task, followed by the two-choice version (cf.
Ansorge & Wühr, 2004). Note that in a previous study using
the same materials and procedure, we obtained grasp compat-
ibility effects in a two-choice task that was not preceded by a
go/no-go task (Canits et al., 2018). Thus, if we were to find a
difference in compatibility effects between go/no-go and the
two-choice versions, this is unlikely to have arisen from a
difference in the order in which the two versions were admin-
istered. A trial started with a fixation (+ sign) in the center of
the computer screen. The fixation remained on the screen until
the participant pressed and held the B key on the computer
keyboard using their dominant hand. After 250 ms, the gray-
scale object photograph appeared in the center of the screen.
Following Bub and Masson (2010), the grayscale photograph
was presented for 200 ms and was then replaced by either the
red or blue version of the same photograph.
In the go/no-go task, participants responded to the go cat-
egory (e.g., red) by releasing the B key and grasping the
cylinder, and to the no-go category (e.g., blue) by holding
the B key. Immediately after the B key was released or after
1,500 ms, the photograph was replaced by a blank screen. The
screen remained blank until the participant had grasped the
cylinder or after 1,500 ms had elapsed. If the response was
incorrect, feedback (BIncorrect^) was given for 500 ms. After
a correct response or after the feedback there was an interstim-
ulus interval (ISI) of 1,000 ms until the next trial started. For
the two-choice version of the task, the procedure was the
same, except that participants responded to both colors by
grasping one of the two cylinders using their dominant hand.
The assignment of cylinder size to color (red vs blue), the
assignment of color to go and no-go responses, and the posi-
tion (left and right) of the cylinders in the two-choice task was
counterbalanced across participants in eight versions of the
experiment. In each counterbalanced version, the cylinder size
for the go color was the same in the go/no-go version and the
two-choice version. Both versions of the task started with 10
Fig. 1 Example of a gray, blue, and red stimulus used in Experiment 1. (Color figure online)
Fig. 2 The Grabbit setup for the go/no-go version (top) and two-choice
version (bottom)
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practice trials followed by 152 experimental trials. For the
experimental trials, each photograph was presented twice.
The photographs were shown in a different random order for
each participant and each task version. Between the two task
versions there was a short break, during which the experi-
menter changed the configuration of the Grabbit.
Results
Reaction times were measured from onset of the color picture to
when the participant grasped the cylinder. Previous experiments
in our lab (Canits et al., 2018) have shown compatibility effects
in both movement initiation times (from picture onset to release
of the B key) and grasping times (from key release to cylinder
grasp), therefore, we looked at RT for the entire response se-
quence from picture onset to cylinder grasp. This is in concor-
dance with Tucker and Ellis (2004) and Bub andMasson (2012),
who also measured RT from picture onset to grasp response.
Reaction times were excluded from the analyses if the response
was incorrect (1.09%), the B key was not released between 100
and 2,000 ms after picture onset, or the cylinder was not grasped
within 2,000 ms after release of the B key (0.30%). Mean reac-
tion times per condition are shown in Fig. 3. All data reported in
this paper, including separate release and movement times, are
available on https://osf.io/x62uv/.
In addition to calculating p values, we calculated the JZS
Bayes factor (BF), which is the ratio of p(D│H0) and
p(D│H1), the probabilities of observing the data under the null
hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis, respectively. The
Bayes factor thus provides a relative measure of the extent to
which the data provide evidence for the null hypothesis of no
effect or the alternative hypothesis (Rouder, Speckman, Sun,
Morey, & Iverson, 2009). Bayes factors between 3 and 10 can
be considered moderate evidence, and Bayes factors above 10
can be considered strong evidence. Bayes factors were calculated
using JASP (Love et al., 2015). Bayes factors are reported for the
critical analyses—that is, the interaction between task (go/no-go
task vs. two-choice task) and compatibility (compatible vs. in-
compatible grasp) and separate t tests for grasp compatibility
effects in the two-choice and go/no-go tasks. The interaction
was tested as a Bayesian paired-samples t test on the difference
(between tasks) of the differences (compatible minus incompat-
ible conditions). All Bayesian t tests were performed with direc-
tional hypotheses and a Cauchy prior width of 0.707.
A 2 (task) × 2 (compatibility) ANOVA indicated that reac-
tion times did not differ between the go/no-go task and the
two-choice task, F(1, 39) = 0.69, p = .412, partial η2 = .02.
The main effect of compatibility was not significant, F(1, 39)
= 2.82, p = .101, partial η2 = .07, and there was no interaction
between task and compatibility, F(1, 39) = 1.84, p = .183,
partial η2 = .05, BF01 = 1.39.
1 Although the interaction was
not significant, we performed follow-up analyses to see
whether compatibility effects were present in either the go/
no-go task or the two-choice task. These analyses showed that
in the go/no-go task there was no effect of compatibility (mean
compatibility effect = 0 ms), t(39) = 0.02, p = .982, Cohen’s d
= 0.00, BF01 = 5.76, but in the two-choice task, participants
responded faster to compatible than to incompatible items
(mean compatibility effect = 8 ms), t(39) = 3.98, p < .001,
Cohen’s d = 0.63, BF10 = 183.
To analyze the compatibility effect across the RT distribu-
tion, the valid RTs were rank ordered and divided into four
bins separately for each participant and for compatible and
incompatible trials such that Bin 1 contained the 25% fastest
RTs, Bin 2 the next 25%, and so on (Cho & Proctor, 2010).
The effect of compatibility for each bin is shown in Fig. 4. A 2
(task) × 2 (compatibility) × 4 (bin) ANOVA showed no inter-
action between bin and compatibility, F(3, 117) = 0.17, p =
.917, partial η2 = .00, nor a three-way interaction between
task, bin, and compatibility, F(3, 117) = 1.52, p = .213, partial
η2 = .04. That the effect did not differ as a result of RT sug-
gests that the difference between the tasks is not due to differ-
ences in overall RT between the tasks.
The mean error rates are shown in Table 1. As can be seen,
the overall error rate was very low at 0.8%. Because of the low
error rates, we expected compatibility effects to show up pri-
marily in the RTanalyses. For completeness, however, we also
report statistical analyses of the error rates. A 2 (task) × 2
(compatibility) ANOVA showed a marginally significant ef-
fect of task, F(1, 39) = 3.31, p = .076, partial η2 = .08, which
indicated that responses that slightly fewer errors were made
in the go/no-go than in the two-choice task. Compatibility did
not affect error rate, F(1, 39) = 0.10, p = .749, partial η2 = .00,
and there was no interaction between task and compatibility,
F(1, 39) = 0.01, p = .925, partial η2 = .00, BF01 = 5.44.
The results of Experiment 1 thus provided evidence for a
grasp compatibility effect in the two-choice task and no effect
Fig. 3 Reaction times in the color decision task to object pictures in
Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard errors of the within-task
difference between compatible and incompatible trials
1 Throughout this paper we report BF01 if the evidence is in favor of H0, and
BF10 if the evidence is in favor of H1.
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in the go/no-go task. The absence of an interaction between task
and compatibility, however, prevents us from drawing strong
conclusions. In the next experiment, we investigated if more
conclusive results would be found in a task in which participants
made semantic decisions by responding to object category (nat-
ural or artefact), as was done in the original study by Tucker and
Ellis (2004).Whereas the color decision task could be performed
without much attention to the object identity, semantic decisions
require object identification and therefore may lead to stronger
activation of the object concept than color decisions. If motor
actions are activated as part of the object representation, we
should expect size compatibility effects in both tasks. If the com-
patibility effect is due, however, to size correspondence between
stimulus and response, we should expect compatibility effects
only in the two-choice task.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants Forty students at the Erasmus University
Rotterdam participated for course credit. None had participat-
ed in Experiment 1.
Materials and procedure We used the same grayscale photo-
graphs as in Experiment 1. The procedure was similar to that
of Experiment 1, except that objects did not change color and
participants were instructed to respond to the semantic cate-
gory (natural or artefact) of the object. In each category, 19
objects required a precision grip, and 19 objects required a
power grip. Assignment of category to cylinder size and go
or no-go condition, and assignment of cylinder to position was
counterbalanced across participants.
Results
Reaction times were measured from onset of the picture to
when the participant grasped the cylinder. Reaction times
were excluded from the analyses if the response was incorrect
(3.14%), the B key was not released between 100 and
2,000 ms after picture onset, and the cylinder was not grasped
within 2,000 ms after release of the B key (0.61%). Mean
reaction times per condition are shown in Fig. 5. A 2 (task)
× 2 (compatibility) ANOVA indicated that participants were
slower in the go/no-go task than in the two-choice task, F(1,
39) = 8.80, p = .005, partial η2 = .18. The main effect of
compatibility was not significant, F(1, 39) = 1.26, p = .269,
but the interaction between task and compatibility was signif-
icant, F(1, 39) = 7.46, p = .009, partial η2 = .16, BF10 = 8.53,
indicating that the size of the grasp compatibility effect was
different for the go/no-go and two-choice task. Follow-up
analyses showed that in the go/no-go task there was no effect
of compatibility (mean compatibility effect = −8 ms), t(39) =
1.02, p = .314, Cohen’s d = 0.16, BF01 = 11.00, but in the two-
choice task participants responded faster to compatible than to
incompatible trials (mean compatibility effect = 17 ms), t(39)
= 4.67, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.74, BF10 = 1,276.
The compatibility effect across the RT distribution is
shown in Fig. 6. A 2 (task) × 2 (compatibility) × 4 (bin)
ANOVA showed no interaction between bin and compatibil-
ity, F(3, 117) = 0.10, p = .959, partial η2 = .00, BF01 = 74.2,
Table 1 Error rates (with standard errors of the mean in parentheses) in
Experiments 1–3
Task Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Go/no-go
Compatible .003 (.002) .035 (.019) .067 (.029)
Incompatible .003 (.002) .033 (.019) .067 (.030)
Two-choice
Compatible .014 (.006) .018 (.005) .028 (.008)
Incompatible .013 (.005) .029 (.005) .037 (.009)
Fig. 5. Reaction times in the artefact/natural object decision task to object
pictures in Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard errors of the
within-task difference between compatible and incompatible trials
Fig. 4 Effect of compatibility per quartile bin in the color decision task to
object pictures in Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard errors of the
within-bin difference between compatible and incompatible trials
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nor a three-way interaction between task, bin, and compatibil-
ity, F(3, 117) = 1.10, p = .354, partial η2 = .03, BF01 = 26.0.
The mean error rates are shown in Table 1. The ANOVA
indicated that error rates did not differ between the go/no-go
task and the two-choice task, F(1, 39) = 0.35, p = .556, partial
η2 = .01. The main effect of compatibility was not significant,
F(1, 39) = 1.96, p = .170, partial η2 = .05, and the interaction
indicated that the effect of compatibility differed between
tasks, F(1, 39) = 5.83, p = .021, partial η2 = .13, BF10 =
4.39. Follow-up analyses showed that in the go/no-go task
there was no difference, t(39) = 0.60, p = .555, Cohen’s d =
0.09, BF01 = 8.76, but in the two-choice task participants
made fewer errors on compatible than on incompatible trials,
t(39) = 2.34, p = .024, Cohen’s d = 0.37, BF10 = 3.78.
To summarize, these results show an effect of grasp com-
patibility in the two-choice version of the task, which repli-
cates earlier findings of grasp compatibility effects. In the go/
no-go version, again, no grasp compatibility effect was obtain-
ed. Note that Canits et al. (2018, Experiment 1) obtained a
similar compatibility effect (17 ms) as we did (17 ms) in a
two-choice task using the same materials and procedure, but
without a preceding go/no-go task. Thus, the effect in the two-
choice task seems to be unaffected by task order.
As an aside, it may seem surprising that responses were
faster in the two-choice than in the go/no-go task. The me-
chanics of the two-choice task, however, made it possible for
participants to start moving by releasing the b-key before hav-
ing fully decided which response to give because they could
still make both grasping responses. Therefore, part of the de-
cision time might have been absorbed in the movement time.
In the go/no-go task, however, they needed to decide whether
to release the B key or not. Therefore, to start moving before
having fully decided which response to give would have re-
sulted in incorrect responses on half of the trials. Thus, partic-
ipants could initiate their response action sooner in the two-
choice task than in the go/no-go task. Indeed, participants
released the B key faster in the two-choice task (M = 556) than
in the go/no-go task (M = 657). In addition, participants may
also have been faster due to practice.
Next, we wanted to test if the same pattern of results could
be obtained for object names. Tucker and Ellis (2004; see also
Bub et al., 2008) obtained similar compatibility effects for
object pictures and object names. Compatibility effects for
words indicate that the effect is not entirely due to direct visual
information about object affordances but, at least to some
significant extent, also to object representations in memory.
In Experiment 3, we therefore presented object names rather
than pictures in the natural/artefact decision task.
Experiment 3
Method
Participants Forty students at the Erasmus University
Rotterdam participated for course credit. None had participat-
ed in Experiments 1 or 2.
Materials and procedure Stimuli were the names of the ob-
jects used in Experiments 1 and 2. Three objects were replaced
because their names were ambiguous. All stimuli are listed in
the Appendix Table 2. The procedure was the same as that of
Experiment 2.
Results
Reaction times were measured from onset of the word to
when the participant grasped the cylinder. Data from one
participant were excluded because the participant had no
valid reaction times in the go/no-go task, leaving data
from 39 participants for the analyses. Reaction times were
excluded from the analyses if the response was incorrect
(5.88%), the B key was not released between 100 and
2,000 ms after picture onset, and the cylinder was not
grasped within 2,000 ms after release of the B key
(1.40%). Mean reaction times per condition are shown
in Fig. 7. A 2 (task) × 2 (compatibility) ANOVA indicated
that reaction times were slower in the go/no-go task than
in the two-choice task, F(1, 38) = 66.36, p < .001, partial
η2 = .64. The main effect of compatibility was not signif-
icant, F(1, 38) = 0.46, p = .500, partial η2 = .01, but the
interaction indicated that the effect of compatibility was
different for the go/no-go task and two-choice task, F(1,
38) = 4.39, p = .043, partial η2 = .10, BF10 = 2.39.
Follow-up analyses showed that in the go/no-go task there
was no effect of compatibility (mean compatibility effect
= −6 ms), t(38) = 0.72, p = .476, Cohen’s d = 0.12, BF01
= 9.29, but in the two-choice task participants responded
Fig. 6 Effect of compatibility per quartile bin in the artefact/natural object
decision task to object pictures in Experiment 2. Error bars represent
standard errors of the within-bin difference between compatible and
incompatible trials
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faster to compatible than to incompatible items (mean
compatibility effect = 15 ms), t(38) = 2.57, p = .014,
Cohen’s d = 0.41, BF10 = 6.02. Note that the compatibil-
ity effect (16 ms) in the two-choice task is similar to that
of Canits et al. (2018, Experiment 2, 17 ms), who also
used word names. Thus, the effect in the two-choice task
again seems to be unaffected by the preceding go/no-go
task.
The compatibility effect across the RT distribution is
shown in Fig. 8. A 2 (task) × 2 (compatibility) × 4 (bin)
ANOVA showed no interaction between bin and compatibil-
ity, F(3, 114) = 0.61, p = .607, partial η2 = .02, BF01 = 64.7,
nor a three-way interaction between task, bin, and compatibil-
ity, F(3, 114) = 0.26, p = .857, partial η2 = .01, BF01 = 27.8.
The mean error rates are shown in Table 1. The ANOVA
showed no significant effect of task, F(1, 38) = 0.36, p = .553,
partial η2 = .01, no effect of compatibility, F(1, 38) = 1.62, p =
.211, partial η2 = .04, and no interaction between task and com-
patibility, F(1, 38) = 2.68, p = .110, partial η2 = .07, BF10 = 1.10.
Combined analyses of Experiment 1–3
To have more powerful tests of the grasp compatibility effects
in the go/no-go and choice-reaction tasks, we performed ad-
ditional analyses in which we combined the RT data from
Experiments 1 to 3. A three-way mixed-factor ANOVAwith
experiment as a between-subjects factor, and task and grasp
compatibility as within-subjects factors showed a significant
two-way interaction between task and grasp compatibility,
F(1, 116) = 13.23, p < .001, BF10 = 91.93, indicating that
the grasp compatibility effect was larger in the two-choice task
than in the go/no-go task. We subsequently performed sepa-
rate two-way ANOVAs on the go/no-go task and two-choice
task.
The two-way mixed ANOVA on the go/no-go task, with
experiment as a between subjects factor and grasp compatibil-
ity as a within-subjects factor, showed a main effect of exper-
iment, F(2, 116) = 59.15, p < .001. Overall responses were
fastest in Experiment 1 and slowest in Experiment 3. Most
important, the main effect of grasp compatibility was not sig-
nificant (mean compatibility effect = −5 ms, 95% CI [−13.7
ms, 3.9 ms]), F(1, 116) = 1.02, p = .28, and neither was the
interaction between grasp compatibility and experiment, F(1,
116) < 1, p = .73. A Bayesian paired-samples t test for the
grasp compatibility effect across Experiments 1–3 provided
strong evidence for the null hypothesis of no effect, BF01 =
19.05.
The two-way mixed ANOVA on the two-choice task, with
experiment as a between subjects factor and grasp compatibil-
ity as a within-subjects factor, showed a main effect of exper-
iment, F(2, 116) = 32.28, p < .001. Overall responses were
fastest in Experiment 1 and slowest in Experiment 3. Most
important, there was a significant main effect of grasp com-
patibility (mean compatibility effect = 13.4 ms, 95% CI [8.7
ms, 18.2 ms]), F(1, 116) = 31.59, p < .001, but no interaction
between grasp compatibility and experiment, F(1, 116) =
1.12, p = .33. A Bayesian paired-samples t test for the grasp
compatibility effect across Experiments 1–3 provided over-
whelming evidence for the alternative hypothesis, BF10 >
100.000.2
Fig. 7 Reaction times in the artefact/natural object decision task to object
names in Experiment 3. Error bars represent standard errors of the within-
task difference between compatible and incompatible trials
Fig. 8 Effect of compatibility per quartile bin in the artefact/natural object
decision task to object names in Experiment 3. Error bars represent
standard errors of the within-bin difference between compatible and
incompatible trials
2 Separate analyses of release times (the time from stimulus onset until release
of the B key) and movement times (the time from key release until grasping of
the cylinder) in these combined data showed the same pattern of results.
Release times showed no main effect of compatibility, F(1, 116) = 0.25, p =
.619, but there was an interaction between compatibility and task, F(1, 116) =
6.50, p = .012. Follow-up analyses showed no effect of compatibility in the go/
no-go task (−5 ms), F(1, 116) = 1.14, p = .288, but a significant effect in the
two-choice task (7 ms), F(1, 116) = 16.91, p < .001. Movement times were
overall faster for compatible than for incompatible trials, F(1, 116) = 7.19, p =
.008. The compatibility effect interacted with task, F(1, 116) = 9.36, p = .003.
Follow-up analyses showed no effect of compatibility in the go/no-go task (0
ms), F(1, 116) = 0.03, p = .873 but a significant effect in the two-choice task (6
ms), F(1, 116) = 13.37, p < .001. Data from each of the experiments showed
this pattern, although the effects were small and not always significant.
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General discussion
In three experiments we examined grasp compatibility effects
in a go/no-go task and a two-choice task. In all three experi-
ments, the results showed that in the two-choice task grasp
responses were facilitated if the grasp was compatible with the
stimulus compared with when the grasp was incompatible
with the stimulus. In contrast, no grasp compatibility effect
was obtained in the go/no-go task. These results thus show
that the grasp compatibility effect depends on the availability
of response alternatives. When participants have to choose
between two responses, the dimension on which they vary,
in this case grasp size, becomes task relevant, and correspon-
dences between stimulus and response affect performance.
When participants have to choose between a grasp response
and no response, however, grasp size is no longer relevant,
and stimulus size does not affect performance.
Our results are in line with the view that grasp compatibil-
ity effects arise from correspondence in abstract codes be-
tween stimulus and response (Cho & Proctor, 2010; Proctor
& Miles, 2014). According to this view, when stimuli and
responses can be coded along the same dimension, responses
are facilitated when stimulus and response on a particular trial
are aligned on this dimension compared with when they are
misaligned. Our results are comparable to those obtained by
Ansorge and Wühr (2004), who showed that the Simon effect
did not occur in a go/no-go version of a regular Simon task.
They argue that in the go/no-go task, participants no longer
have to refer to spatial codes in order to decide which response
should be given. A spatial code is still needed to make a go
response, but does not have to be distinguished from a partic-
ular other spatial code. Likewise, in our go/no-go task, partic-
ipants still needed to make a grasping response on go trials,
but did not need to distinguish that grasping response from
another one. These findings are problematic for the view that
the grasp compatibility effect is caused by stimulus-driven
activation of grasping actions or affordances when objects
are represented. If the representation of an object would acti-
vate a grasping action, compatible grasps should have been
facilitated relative to incompatible grasps, irrespective of the
presence of a choice between alternative grasps (Roest et al.,
2016).
This conclusion may seem at odds with some findings that
have suggested a role for motor actions. For example, some
researchers have found that grasp compatibility effects are
obtained only when objects are depicted within reachable
space, but not when they are depicted as being beyond reach
(Costantini, Ambrosini, Tieri, Sinigaglia, & Committeri,
2010; Ferri et al., 2011). These findings suggest that partici-
pants activated grasping actions. It is possible, however, that
objects that are depicted as being beyond reach appear less
variable in size than objects that are within reachable space.
Another finding that may seem at odds is that the
compatibility effect was reduced to nonsignificance when par-
ticipants pointed and touched one of the four response devices
that were arranged in a curved line with the tip of their finger
rather than grasped it (Bub et al., 2008; Girardi, et al., 2010).
Bub and Masson (2010) proposed that compatibility effects
are due to actions activated by the object, but only occur when
there is competition between different grasping responses.
Our present results are consistent with this view, but seem hard
to reconcile with the idea that object concepts automatically
activate actions. Although competition between response ac-
tions may increase compatibility effects, it seems unlikely that
automatically activated actions would have no effect at all in
the absence of response competition. Indeed, many explana-
tions of compatibility effects refer to competition between the
activated action and response action rather than competition
between two response actions. On such an account, the incom-
patible condition in the go/no-go task should still have in-
duced competition between the action activated by the object
and the response action and resulted in slower RTs. Thus, we
cannot rule out Bub and Masson’s (2010) account, but an
account based on abstract size codes seems more likely and
more parsimonious.
Our results support the proposal that grasp compatibility
is caused by correspondence in size between object and
response (Cho & Proctor, 2010; Masson, 2015; Proctor &
Miles, 2014) and are consistent with similar proposals to
explain the spatial alignment effect. On this account, spa-
tial representations are not modality specific, but at a level
where visual location and response location have a shared
representation. Left–right alignment effects between ob-
jects with a graspable part and a left–right response action
show similar patterns of results as the Simon effect and
therefore might also be better explained by correspondence
between abstract spatial codes. Indeed, when objects are
presented centrally, the spatial alignment effect is often
not obtained unless participants’ attention is focused on
the graspable part by instruction (Thomas et al., 2019; Yu
et al., 2014) or when participants make reach and grasp
responses (Bub & Masson, 2010). When the body of the
object (instead of the entire object) is centered such that the
graspable part protrudes to the left or right, alignment ef-
fects are observed even when responses are unrelated to the
grasping actions, such as within-hand key presses (Cho &
Proctor, 2010) or responses with the feet (Phillips & Ward,
2002). Similar to the present study, Roest et al. (2016) have
shown that the spatial alignment effect is absent in a go/no-
go task. Although fewer studies have investigated the
grasp compatibility effect, our results suggest that this ef-
fect is also better explained by correspondence in abstract
codes for size rather than the automatic activation of motor
affordances. More so than the spatial alignment effect, the
grasp compatibility effect was expected to provide evi-
dence for the activation of motor affordances (Borghi &
Mem Cogn
Riggio, 2015; Yu et al., 2014). Nevertheless, our findings
are more consistent with an abstract coding account.
Action compatibility effects are often considered as support
for the grounded cognition account (Barsalou, 1999;
Glenberg, 1997). On this account, cognition shares processing
mechanisms with perception and action. The idea that motor
actions are automatically activated during object representa-
tions is consistent with the view that motor actions are part of
those object representations. Our results, however, are not
consistent with such a strong version of the grounded cogni-
tion perspective.We should note, however, that several hybrid
theories of grounded cognition have been proposed in which
grounded and symbolic (i.e., linguistic) representations are
combined (Andrews, Vigliocco, & Vinson, 2009; Borghi &
Cimatti, 2009; Dove, 2014; Durda, Buchanan, & Caron,
2009; Simmons, Hamann, Harenski, Hu, & Barsalou, 2008;
Zwaan, 2014). Thus, although none of these theories have
been concerned with alignment or grasp compatibility effects,
theories of cognition and action that incorporate both abstract
spatial codes and specific motor representations can be pro-
posed. We certainly do not argue that specific action represen-
tations do not exist. Our results do, however, suggest that
grasp compatibility effects are probably best explained by
abstract spatial codes and not by the activation of highly spe-
cific action representations. Although our results strongly sug-
gest that motor actions are not automatically activated when
graspable objects are mentally represented, we do not argue
that motor actions are never part of object representations.
People have knowledge of the potential interactions with ob-
jects, and this knowledge may be activated as part of the
representation. The question remains, however, to what extent
such knowledge shares processing mechanisms with actions,
and as such will manifest itself as action intentions or facilita-
tion of reach and grasp actions that are not aimed at the object
itself.
To conclude, we believe that the grasp compatibility effect
is a reliable effect, but its mere presence does not necessarily
indicate that the grasping actions afforded by an object are
automatically activated.
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Appendix
Table 2 Stimulus materials used in Experiments 1–3
Large artefacts Large natural objects Small artefacts Small natural objects
Bierpul (Beer Mug)
Boor (Drill)
Champagnefles (Champagne Bottle)
Koffiepot (Coffeepot)
Gewicht (Dumbbell)
Gieter (Watering Can)
Hamer (Hammer)
Kan (Jug)
Kandelaar (Candle Holder)
Knoflookpers (Garlic Press)
Maatbeker (Measuring Cup)
Ontstopper (Plunger)
Pan (Pan)
Paraplu (Umbrella)
Spuitbus (Spraying Can)
Steelpan (Saucepan)
Trekker (Squeegee)
Verfroller (Paint Roller)
Zaklantaarn (Flashlight)
Aardappel (Potato)
Aubergine (Eggplant)
Banaan (Banana)
Bleekselderij (Celery)
Broccoli (Broccoli)
Citroen (Lemon)
Courgette (Zucchini)
Dennenappel (Pinecone)
Houtblok (Log)
Komkommer (Cucumber)
Mais (Corn)
Mango (Mango)
Paprika (Bell Pepper)
Peer (Pear)
Prei (Leek)
Sinaasappel (Orange)
Sla (Lettuce)
Tak (Branch)
Ui (Onion)
Haarspeld (Hair Pin)
Knoop (Button)
Krijtje (Crayon)
Mascara (Mascara)
Nietjes (Staples)
Oorbel (Earring)
Paperclip (Paperclip)
Pil (Pill)
Pincet (Tweezers)
Potlood (Pencil)
Rietje (Straw)
Ring (Ring)
Schroef (Screw)
Sigaret (Cigarette)
Snoepje (Candy)
Spijker (Nail)
Veiligheidsspeld (Safety Pin)
Wasknijper (Clothespin)
Wattenstaafje (Cotton Swab)
Blad (Leaf)
Braam (Blackberry)
Druiven (Grapes)
Eikel (Acorn)
Gamba (Gamba)
Knoflook (Garlic)
Koffieboon (Coffee Bean)
Mossel (Mussel)
Olijf (Olive)
Paardenbloem (Dandelion)
Paddenstoel (Mushroom)
Peterselie (Parsley)
Pinda (Peanut)
Pistache (Pistachio)
Roos (Rose)
Sperzieboon (Green Bean)
Spruitjes (Sprouts)
Veer (Feather)
Walnoot (Walnut)
Note. Stimuli were presented as pictures in Experiments 1 and 2, and as Dutch words in Experiment 3; Approximate English translations are provided in
parentheses. In Experiment 3, the following itemswere replaced: Gewicht (Dumbbell)➔ Jampot (Jam Jar), Trekker (Squeegee)➔Zaag (Saw), and Eikel
(Acorn)➔ Doperwt (Pea)
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